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f·lOTION FOR A RESOLUTIOi~ 
tabled by ~r WALTER, nrs ~IECZOREK-ZEUL, Mr HANSCH, 
i·lrs WEBER, i·lrs SEIB::L-Ef·l(;iERLING, r-lr SIEGLERSCIIr·iiOT, 
Mr WAGNER, ~r ARNDT, M~ NICOLAOU, Mr ENRIGHT, Hs QUIN, 
f.lr GABERT, Mr MUNTINGH, Mr VAN r.JINNEN, r·lr ROGALLA, 
ftlrs HOFF, Mr HULLIGAN, Mr VON DER VRWG, f.lrs VIEHOFF ,. 
Mr LINKOHR, ~r GAUTHIER, Mr SEEFELD and ~r WETTIG 
with a request for topical and urgent debate 
.pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure 





- whereas important arms control negotiations are nearing conclusion, 
- alarmed at the growing arms build-up throughout the world, 
- whereas this poses a particularly serious threat to Europe, 
- convinced that there is no alternative to political detente, disarmament 
and a peaceful balance, 
- convinced that it is incumbent upon the European Parliament as on all 
parliaments to support every effort in the interests of peace, 
1. Welcomes the Nuclear Freeze Resolution passed by the US House of 
Representatives on 4 May 1983 and endorses its proposals; 
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in political cooperation and the Congress of the United States. 
Text of the Nuclear Freeze Resolution 
PE 87.013 
NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION OF THE US CONGRESS (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) 
4th May, 1983) 
Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on anireductions in 
nuclear weapons. Whereas the· greatest challenge facing the 
earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident 
or design; 
Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union have signed the 
joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, 
known as the McCloy-Zorin agreement, enumerating general principles 
for future negotiations for international peace and securityJ 
Whereas the increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
delivery systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union 
have not strengthened international peace and security. but in 
fact enhance the prospect for ~utual destructioni 
Whereas adequate verification of compliance has always been an 
indispensable part of any international arms control agreement; 
and 
whereas a mutual and verifiable freeze and reductions in nuclear 
weapons and nuclear delivery systems would greatly reduce the 
risk of nuclear war: now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate 
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, that, consistent with the maintenance of 
essential equivalence in overall nuclear capabilities at present and 
in the future, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between 
the United States and the Soviet Union should have the following 
objectives : 
1. Pursuing the objective of negotiating an immediat~ mutual 
and verifiable freeze. Then pursuing the objective of 
negotiating immediate, mutual and verifiable reductions in 
nuclear weapons. 
2. Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze 
on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, 
missiles and other delivery systems which would threaten the 
viability of sea-based nuclear deterrent forces ·and to include 
all air defense systems designed to stop nuclear bombers. Sub-
marines are not delivery systems as used herein. 
3. Consistent with pursuing the objective of negotiating an 
immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, giving special 
attention to destabilising weapons, especially those which give 
either nation capabilities which confer upon it even the 
hypo~hetical advantages of a first strike. 
4. Providing for cooperative measures of verification, including 
provisions for on-site inspection, as appropriate, to complement 




5. Proceeding ~om this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing 
substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions through 
numerical ceilings, annual percentages or any other equally 
effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic 
stability, with such reductions to be achieved within a 
reasonable, specified period of tiae as determined by the 
negotiations. 
6. Preserving present limitations and controls on nuclear 
weapons and nuclear delivery systems. 
-7. Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-
range nuclear systems into the START negotiations •. Discussing 
the impact of developing comprehensive defensive systems con-
sistent with all provisions of the treaty on the limitation of 
anti-ballistic missile systems. 
8. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed by United 
States negotiations to mandate any agreement that would jeopardise 
our ability to preserve freedom. 
In those negotiations, the United States shall make every effort 
to reach a common position with our North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation allies on any element of an agreement which would. 
be inconsistent with existing United States commitments to 
those allies. 
sec. 2 In the absence of a bilateral agreement embodying 
the objectives set forth ln this joint resolution, nothing in 
this resolution is inte~d to prevent the United States from 
carrying out its responsibilities un4er the December 1979 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation decision regarding intermediate 
range nuclear forces. 
' 
Sec. 3 (a) Consistent with pur~uing the overriding objective of ~ 
negotiating an immediate, mutu~l and verifiable freeze, nothing 
in ~i~ resolution shall be construed to prevent the United 
States from takLng advantage of concurrent and complementary 
arms control proposals. 
(b) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to supercede 
the treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution. 
sec. 4 This resolution does not endorse any type of unilateral 
disarmament on the part of the United States. 
sec. 5 Consistent with pur:.suing the overriding objective of 
negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, nothing 
in this resolution should be construed to prevent measures 
necessary for the maintenance of and credibility of the United 
States nuclear deterrent. 
Sec. 6 Until such timeasthe final instrument embodying the 
d:;jectives set forth in section l has been fully ratified by both the 
Soviet Union and the United States, nothing in this joint resolution shall 
t.e construed to prevent whatever modernisation and deployment of United 
States weapons may be required to maintain the credibility of the United 
States nuclear deterrent. 
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3. 
Sec. 7 The Congtess proposes that the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Re·lations 
study measures relating to reductions pursuant to the first 
section. And relating to concurrent and complementary arms 
control proposals pursuant to section 2, especially those aimed 
at progressive reductions in the number of destabilising weapons 
through a mutual "build-down• or other verifiable processes. 
Sec. 8 Any freeze agreement negotiated pursuant to this 
resolution should not p~ent the United States from taking 
such measures with respect to our strategic systems as are 
necessary to protect the lives of the United States personnel 
operating those systems. 
sec. 9 For purposes of this resolution, a nuclear delivery vehicle 
is a device whose .primary or exclusive mission requires it to 
carry a nuclear weapon into territory of or occupied by hostile 
forces. 
Sec. 10 A freeze agreement in accordance with this resolution 
will not preclude the one-for-one replacement of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear delivery vehicles in order to preserve the credibility 
of the United States nuclear deterrence) provided the new weapon 
or delivery vehicle is the same type as the old. 
sec. ll Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed 
i. to prevent, during any negotiations pursuant to this resolution, 
or 
ii. to require that, in any negotiations pursuant to this 
resolution, the United States agree to a provision which 
would prevent, such modernisation and deployment of 
United States new or improved dual capable delivery systems 
as the United States may determine is required to maintain 
the capability of the United States defense posture. 
Sec. 12 Consistent with public law 88-186. As amended, no action 
shall be taken under this act that will obligate the United States 
to disarm or to reduce or to limit the armed forces or armaments 
of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of 
the President under the Constitution or unless authorised by 
further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States. 
~ec. 13 Consistent with the provisions of public law 92-448, as 
amended, negotiations undertaken pursuant to this act shall 
provide, for the maintenance of a vigorous research, development 
and safe~y-related improvements program to assure that the United 
States would not be limited to levels of nuclear deterrent forces 
inferior to the force levels of the Soviet Union. Further, such 
negotiations should recognise the difficulty of maintaining 
essential equivalence and a stable balance in nuclear deterrent 
capabilities in a period of. rapidly developing technology, and 
that any future arms control agreements should .promote and sta~le 
international balance and enhance the survivability of United ~tates 
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4. 
Sec. 14 In all ftegotiations pursuant to this resolution, the 
United States shall make every effort to ensure that any agreement 
reached shall provide for full compliance by all parties with 
pre-existing international treaties, obligations and commitments. 
Sec. 15 
frozen. 
Any item both sides do not agree to freeze would not be 
Sec. 16 The President ~hall take all necessary steps to ensure 
that any agreement embo;f~ng the objectives set forth in this 
joint resolution can be adequately verified, including pursuing 
~he objective of providing the cooperative measures of verification 
(including provisions for onsite inspection as appropriat-e) to 
complement national techni~al means of verification and to 
ensure compliance. 
Sec. 17 Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed 
to prevent safety-related imp~ovements itt strategic bombers. 
Passed the House of Representatives, May 4, 1983. 
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